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ARE THERE REALLY A BEAUTY PREMIUM AND AN UGLINESS PENALTY ON 
EARNINGS? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose Economists have widely documented the “beauty premium” 
and “ugliness penalty” on earnings.  Explanations based on employer and 
client discrimination would predict a monotonic association between physical 
attractiveness and earnings; explanations based on occupational self-selection 
would explain the beauty premium as a function of workers’ occupations; and 
explanations based on individual differences would predict that the beauty 
premium would disappear once appropriate individual differences are 
controlled.  In this paper, we empirically tested the three competing 
hypotheses about the “beauty premium.” 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach We analyzed a nationally representative 
and prospectively longitudinal sample from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Adolescent Health (Add Health). 
 
Findings The results contradicted the discrimination and self-selection 
explanations and strongly supported the individual differences explanation.  
Very unattractive respondents always earned significantly more than 
unattractive respondents, sometimes more than average-looking or attractive 
respondents.  Multiple regression analyses showed that there was very weak 
evidence for the beauty premium, and it disappeared completely once 
individual differences, such as health, intelligence, and Big Five personality 
factors, were statistically controlled. 
 
Implications Past findings of beauty premium and ugliness penalty may 
possibly be due to the fact that:  1) “very unattractive” and “unattractive” 
categories are usually collapsed into “below average” category; and 2) health, 
intelligence (as opposed to education) and Big Five personality factors are not 
controlled.  It appears that more beautiful workers earn more, not because 
they are beautiful, but because they are healthier, more intelligent, and have 
better (more Conscientious and Extraverted, and less Neurotic) personality. 
 
Originality/Value This is the first study to show that:  1) very 
unattractive workers have extremely high earnings and earn more than 
physically more attractive workers, suggesting evidence for the potential 
ugliness premium; and 2) the apparent beauty premium and ugliness penalty 
may be a function of unmeasured traits correlated with physical attractiveness, 
such as health, intelligence, and personality. 
 
 
Keywords:  Physical attractiveness; earnings; discrimination; occupational self-selection; 
individual differences; productivity
  
ARE THERE REALLY A BEAUTY PREMIUM AND AN UGLINESS PENALTY ON 
EARNINGS? 
 
Introduction 
Economists have widely documented the “beauty premium” – or, conversely, the 
“ugliness penalty” – on wages.  Population-based surveys show that individuals who are 
above average in physical attractiveness earn more money, and those who are below average 
in physical attractiveness earn less money, than average-looking individuals in the United 
States and Canada (Fletcher, 2009; Judge, Hurst, & Simon, 2009; Hamermesh & Biddle, 
1994) and in the United Kingdom (Harper, 2000).  Within specific professions, graduates of 
law schools who are physically more attractive make more money as lawyers after five years 
of practice than their classmates who are physically less attractive (Biddle & Hamermesh, 
1998), and physically more attractive MBA graduates make more money in their careers in 
management than physically less attractive MBAs (Frieze, Olson, & Russell, 1991).  The 
operation of the beauty premium has also been documented in a large number of laboratory 
experiments (Hosoda, Stone-Romero, & Coats, 2003; Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006).  A 
pioneer in the field of the economics of beauty succinctly summarizes the current state of 
knowledge in a recent book aptly titled Beauty Pays:  Why Attractive People Are More 
Successful (Hamermesh, 2011). 
Although the existence of the “beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty” appears 
beyond dispute, it is not clear why they exist.  Why do physically more attractive workers 
earn more money than physically less attractive workers do?  Why does beauty pay? 
In this paper, we tested three leading explanations of the beauty premium and ugliness 
penalty:  discrimination, self-selection, and individual differences.  We used a nationally 
representative sample from a data set that had very precise and repeated measures of physical 
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attractiveness – the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health), which 
measured physical attractiveness of all respondents on a five-point scale at four different 
points in life over 13 years.  The analyses disconfirmed the discrimination and self-selection 
hypotheses and strongly supported the individual differences hypothesis. 
  
Explanations for the Beauty Premium and Ugliness Penalty 
There are roughly three explanations for the effect of physical attractiveness on 
earnings – discrimination, self-selection, and individual differences (Hamermesh, 2011). 
 
Discrimination 
One explanation for the beauty premium is that physically less attractive workers are 
discriminated against and paid less accordingly (or, equivalently, physically more attractive 
workers are favored and paid more accordingly) (Hamermesh, 2011).  Discrimination based 
on physical attractiveness may come from the employers, coworkers, or customers.  
Employers may preferentially hire and promote physically attractive employees over 
otherwise comparable but physically less attractive applicants/employees.  Alternatively, 
coworkers may prefer to work with physically more attractive individuals, and customers and 
clients may prefer to deal and do business with physically more attractive employees.  In the 
latter case, employers may choose to hire and promote physically more attractive 
applicants/employees even in the absence of beauty bias on their own part simply to respond 
to the demands from existing employees or customers. 
If the beauty premium exists because of discrimination on the part of the employers, 
coworkers, and clients, then there should be a monotonically positive association between 
physical attractiveness and earnings.  Very attractive workers are expected to earn more 
than attractive workers, who are in turn expected to earn more than the average-looking 
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workers.  Very unattractive workers are expected to earn less than unattractive workers, who 
are in turn expected to earn less than average-looking workers.  It would not make logical 
sense for the discrimination hypothesis to posit a non-monotonic association between 
physical attractiveness and earnings, where, for example, very unattractive workers earn 
more than unattractive workers.  It would be very difficult for the discrimination hypothesis 
to explain why employers, coworkers, or clients would discriminate against unattractive 
workers more than they do against very unattractive workers. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (discrimination):  There will be a monotonically positive association 
between physical attractiveness and earnings. 
 
Occupational self-selection 
Beauty premium and ugliness penalty on earnings can emerge in the absence of 
employer or client discrimination if individuals with various levels of physical attractiveness 
sort themselves into different occupations and industries with different levels of average 
earnings (Deryugina & Shurchkov, 2015; Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994).  For example, if 
physically more attractive individuals are more likely to choose to enter occupations that 
have higher mean earnings, and/or if physically less attractive individuals are more likely to 
choose to enter occupations that have lower mean earnings, then there will be a positive 
association between physical attractiveness and mean earnings across occupations, even 
though, within each occupation, physically more attractive workers may not necessarily earn 
more than physically less attractive workers.  Occupational self-selection can potentially 
explain apparent beauty premium and ugliness penalty in the absence of differential treatment 
by employers and clients.  If the beauty premium on earnings exist primarily for reasons of 
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occupational self-selection, however, it should disappear once workers’ occupations are 
statistically controlled. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (occupational self-selection):  The association between physical 
attractiveness and earnings will disappear once respondents’ occupations are statistically 
controlled. 
 
Individual differences 
An entirely different category of explanations suggests that physically more attractive 
workers may be genuinely different from physically less attractive workers in ways that 
affect their productivity.  Evolutionary biologists concur that physical attractiveness – 
reflected in facial symmetry, averageness, and secondary sexual characteristics – is an 
indicator of genetic and developmental health (Bailit, Workman, Niswander, & Maclean, 
1970; Gangestad, Thornhill, & Yeo, 1994; Parsons, 1990, 1992).  Bilateral facial symmetry 
measures physical attractiveness so accurately that there is now a computer program which 
can calculate someone’s level of facial symmetry from a scanned photograph of a face by 
measuring the sizes of and distances between various facial parts and assign a single score for 
physical attractiveness (Grammer & Thornhill, 1994), much like a stadiometer assigns a 
single number for height and a scale assigns a single number for weight. 
These physical attractiveness scores correlate very highly with scores assigned by 
human judges like those used in the current study.  Because they are rooted in genetic and 
developmental health, standards of beauty are universal, both across individuals in a single 
culture and across all cultures (Bernstein, Lin, & McClellan, 1982; Cross & Cross, 1971; 
Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee, Druen, & Wu, 1995; Jones, 1996; Jones & Hill, 1993; Maret 
& Harling, 1985; Morse & Gruzen, 1976; Thakerar & Iwawaki, 1979; Wagatsuma & Kleinke 
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1979).  The current consensus is that, far from being in the eye of the beholder or only skin-
deep, physical attractiveness is an objective and quantifiable trait of individuals like height or 
weight (Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, & Smoot, 2000). 
Physical attractiveness as an indicator of genetic and developmental health is 
significantly positively correlated with adult health (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993; Thornhill 
& Møller, 1997) and general intelligence (Kanazawa, 2011a; Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004), and 
general intelligence is in turn correlated with such factors relevant to productivity as 
personality (Big Five personality factors) (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Chamorro-
Premuzic & Furnham, 2006).  A condition-dependent model of personality (Kanazawa, 
2011b; Lewis, 2015) proposes that adaptive individual differences in personality may emerge 
from universal human nature in response to stable phenotypic features of the individual, such 
as physical attractiveness and formidability.  Because physically attractive children are more 
likely to experience positive feedback from interpersonal interactions, for example, they are 
more likely to develop Extraverted personality than physically less attractive children do 
(Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011). 
If healthier and more intelligent workers, and workers with certain personalities, are 
genuinely more productive and earn more money, then it would appear that physical 
attractiveness is positively associated with earnings.  If physically more attractive workers 
earn more primarily because they are healthier, more intelligent, and/or have personalities 
that increase their productivity, then the “beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty” widely 
reported in previous studies should disappear once health, intelligence, and personality, along 
with other measures of productivity, are statistically controlled.  From this perspective, 
“beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty” are illusory; physically more attractive workers 
earn more money, not because they are more attractive, but because they are healthier, more 
intelligent, and have personality traits that are more conducive to higher earnings.  
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Individual differences hypothesis suggests that physical attractiveness is a confound, and its 
effect on earnings disappears once health, intelligence, and personality traits are statistically 
controlled. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (individual differences):  Physical attractiveness will no longer be 
significantly positively associated with earnings, once health, intelligence and personality 
are statistically controlled. 
 
Empirical Analyses 
Data 
Add Health is a large, nationally representative and prospectively longitudinal study 
of young Americans.  A sample of 80 high schools and 52 middle schools from the US was 
selected with an unequal probability of selection.  Incorporating systematic sampling 
methods and implicit stratification into the Add Health study design ensured this sample was 
representative of US schools with respect to region of country, urbanicity, school size, school 
type, and ethnicity.  A sample of 20,745 adolescents were personally interviewed in their 
homes in 1994–1995 (Wave I) when they were on average 16 years old.  They were again 
interviewed in 1996 (Wave II; n = 14,738; mean age = 17), in 2001–2002 (Wave III; n = 
15,197; mean age = 22) and in 2007–2008 (Wave IV; n = 15,701; mean age = 29). 
 
Dependent variable:  Earnings 
At Age 29, Add Health asked its respondents to indicate their gross personal earnings 
from all sources in the previous calendar year.  For the bivariate analyses below (testing the 
discrimination hypothesis), we used the gross annual earnings at 29 as the dependent 
variable.  For the multiple regression analyses (testing the self-selection and individual 
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differences hypotheses), we took the natural log of the gross earnings in $1K at 29 in order to 
normalize its distribution.  In all analyses below, we excluded respondents who were 
unemployed or out of the labor force.  However, if we included them and assigned them an 
earnings of $0 (or $.01 for natural log transformation), all of our substantive conclusions 
below remained identical.  Note that, throughout our empirical analyses, we used the single 
dependent variable of earnings at 29, while the independent variable (physical attractiveness) 
was measured at four different ages of 16, 17, 22, and 29. 
 
Independent variables:  Physical attractiveness 
At the conclusion of the in-home interview at each wave, the Add Health interviewer 
rated the respondent’s physical attractiveness on a five-point ordinal scale (1 = very 
unattractive, 2 = unattractive, 3 = about average, 4 = attractive, 5 = very attractive).  We 
used the measures of physical attractiveness from all four waves, by four different 
interviewers over 13 years, as the independent variables.  As noted above, ratings of 
physical attractiveness by human judges are known to be highly correlated with measures of 
bilateral facial symmetry by a computer program and are intersubjectively stable.  However, 
we tested this assumption directly by computing Rwg as a measure of interrater agreement 
(James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). 
Table 1 presents the mean Rwg for each category of physical attractiveness for all 
four waves, for the full sample and separately by sex.  Each respondent is represented four 
times in the table, categorized by how their physical attractiveness was coded in each wave.  
The table shows that the interrater agreement measured by Rwg was extremely high for all 
physical attractiveness categories except for “very unattractive.”  It appeared as though Add 
Health interviewers might have been somewhat reluctant to rate respondents’ physical 
appearance as “very unattractive.”  This was evident from the fact that exactly the same 
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pattern of very high mean Rwg for all categories except for “very unattractive” was also 
observed for another interviewer-rated trait of “attractiveness of personality,” where the 
interviewer rated the attractiveness of the respondent’s personality on the same five-point 
ordinal scale.  Add Health interviewers appeared to be reluctant to label their respondents 
“very unattractive” on any dimension. 
– Table 1 about here – 
Mean interrater agreement for all categories of physical attractiveness was .7861 (SD 
= .2371); it was significantly higher for men (.8090) than for women (.7671) (t(10038) = -
8.844, p < .001).  Rwg ranged from -1.0 to 1.0; 2.5% of the respondents (n = 255) had a 
negative Rwg, which happens when the observed variance in their four attractiveness ratings 
is greater than the theoretically maximum variance under a complete lack of agreement 
(derived from a uniform distribution) and indicates an extremely low level of interrater 
agreement.  ICC(1) was .475 and ICC(2) was .478. 
 
Control variable:  Occupation 
In order specifically to test Hypothesis 2 about occupational self-selection, we 
controlled for the respondent’s occupation.  Add Health measured the occupation of its 
respondents by the Bureau of Labor 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC).  We 
used the first two digits of SOC to measure the respondent’s current occupation at Age 29 in 
23 “major groups” designated by SOC:  management (reference category); business and 
financial; computer and mathematical; architecture and engineering; life, physical and social 
science; community and social services; legal; education, training, library; arts, design, 
entertainment, sports, and media; healthcare practitioners and technical; healthcare support; 
protective service; food preparation and service related; building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance; personal care and service; sales and related; office and administrative support; 
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farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; installation, maintenance, and 
repair; production; transportation and material moving; and military specific. 
 
Correlates of physical attractiveness:  Health 
Evolutionary biologists have long known that physical attractiveness is an indicator of 
genetic and developmental health (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993); beauty is a “health 
certification” (Thornhill & Møller, 1997, pp. 528-533).  As a result, physically more 
attractive individuals are on average healthier than physically less attractive individuals (Al-
Eisa, Egan, & Wassersub, 2004; Hönekopp, Bartholomé, & Jansen, 2004; Henderson & 
Anglin, 2003; Shackelford & Larsen, 1999).  At the same time, more intelligent individuals 
are also healthier than less intelligent individuals (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007; 
Gottfredson & Deary, 2004). 
Add Health asked its respondents to assess their health on a five-point Likert scale (1 
= poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good; 5 = excellent) at each age.  We performed a 
principal component analysis with the four measures of self-assessed health in order to 
construct a latent measure of life-long health.  The analysis extracted only one principal 
component, and all four measures loaded on it with reasonably high loadings (Age 16 = .754; 
Age 17 = .773; Age 22 = .710; Age 29 = .655).  We used the extracted principal component, 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, as the measure of life-long health. 
 
Correlates of physical attractiveness:  General intelligence 
By general intelligence, we mean “the ability to reason deductively or inductively, 
think abstractly, use analogies, synthesize information, and apply it to new domains” 
(Kanazawa, 2010, p. 281).  General intelligence is known to be positively correlated with 
physical attractiveness (Kanazawa, 2011a; Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004).  Add Health 
  10 
measured respondents’ intelligence with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) at 
Ages 16 and 22, and with working memory tests (word recall and backward digit span) at 
Age 29.  PPVT measures verbal intelligence by asking respondents to select one picture out 
of four that matches a given word.  Word recall test gives respondents a list of 15 words and 
asks them to recall as many of them as possible within 90 seconds.  Backward digit span 
gives respondents a sequence of two to eight digits and asks them to recite the numbers 
backwards.  Test scores at each age were converted into the standard IQ scores, with a mean 
of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.  We then performed a principal component analysis 
with the three IQ scores at three different ages in order to compute an overall IQ score.  The 
analysis extracted only one principal component, and all three scores have reasonably high 
loadings (Age 16 = .854; Age 22 = .834; Age 29 = .628).  The extracted latent factor was 
once again converted into the standard IQ score. 
 
Correlates of physical attractiveness:  Big Five personality factors 
Personality factors are known to be correlated with general intelligence (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2006; Moutafi, Furnham, & Paltiel, 
2004), and the condition-dependent model of personality explains why physical attractiveness 
may be correlated with personality traits (Kanazawa, 2011b; Lewis, 2015; Lukaszewski & 
Roney, 2011).  Add Health measured each of the Big Five personality factors (Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism) with a 20-item short-form 
version of the International Personality Item Pool-Five-Factor Model (the Mini-IPIP) 
(Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006).  The respondents at 29 could indicate 
agreement with each of the 20 statements (four each for a personality factor) on a five-point 
Likert scale, from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  The respondent’s score on each 
personality factor therefore ranged from 4 to 20. 
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Correlates of general intelligence:  Height 
Height is known to be positively correlated with general intelligence (Jensen & Sinha, 
1993; Kanazawa & Reyniers, 2009) as well as earnings (Case & Paxson, 2008; Gao & 
Smyth, 2010; Persico, Postlewaite, & Silverman, 2004).  At 29, the Add Health interviewer 
measured each respondent’s height with a carpenter’s steel tape measure to the nearest .5 cm.  
We used the interviewer-measured (rather than self-reported) height in cm as a measure of 
height. 
 
Demographic and socioeconomic control variables 
In our multiple regression analyses, we further controlled for the respondent’s sex (0 
= female, 1 = male), age, race (with three dummies for Asian, black, and Native American, 
with white as the reference category), education (on a 13-point Likert scale from 1 = eighth 
grade or less to 13 = completed post-baccalaureate professional education), childhood gross 
family income (in $1K) at 16; mother’s education, and father’s education (both measured at 
16 on a nine-point Likert scale from 0 = no education to 8 = postgraduate). 
 
Results 
Physical Attractiveness as an Aggregate, Continuous Variable 
Before we tested our hypotheses, we attempted to replicate past findings of “beauty 
premium” and “ugliness penalty” by regressing earnings on an aggregate, continuous 
measure of physical attractiveness.  In order to aggregate the four measures of physical 
attractiveness over 13 years, we performed a principal component analysis to extract a latent 
factor.  All four measures of physical attractiveness loaded only on one latent factor, with 
reasonably high factor loadings (Age 16 = .680; Age 17 = .705; Age 22 = .588; Age 29 = 
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.514).  We used the latent factor, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, as the 
aggregate, continuous measure of physical attractiveness.  All of our substantive 
conclusions remained virtually identical if we used a mean of the four measures of physical 
attractiveness rather than the latent factor.  Table 2 presents th 
e descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analyses in this section. 
– Table 2 about here – 
Table 3, top panel, shows the results of the regression analysis with the full sample.  
Column (1) shows that, when entered alone, physical attractiveness is significantly positively 
associated with earnings (b = .135, p < .001, standardized regression coefficient = .131), 
replicating the earlier findings of “beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty.”  Column (2) 
shows that a quadratic term for physical attractiveness, when added to the equation alone 
with the main term, is statistically significantly negative (b = -.019, p = .019), indicating that 
there may be diminishing returns to physical attractiveness on earnings.  Column (3) shows 
that the quadratic term was no longer significant once sex, age, and education – all of which 
were significantly associated with earnings – were controlled, while the main term for 
physical attractiveness remained significant.  This suggests that the diminishing returns to 
physical attractiveness might have been artifactual and resulted from the fact that women on 
average were physically more attractive but earned less than men (See Table 2).  Column 
(4) shows that the association between physical attractiveness and earnings was marginally 
significantly moderated by sex (b = -.042, p = .053, standardized regression coefficient = -
.026), but not at all by age (b = -.001, p = .861; standardized regression coefficient = -.031) or 
education (b = -.006, p = .226, standardized regression coefficient = -.035).  Contrary to 
earlier findings (Hamermesh, 2011, p. 55–58), our results suggested that the “beauty 
premium” was greater for women than for men. 
– Table 3 about here – 
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In Table 3, bottom panel, we present the results of the same analyses with a limited 
sample of respondents with Rwg of at least .70.  It shows that, apart from the fact that the 
interaction between physical attractiveness and sex was now significantly negative (b = -.057, 
p = .020, standardized regression coefficient = -.036), the substantive conclusions were 
identical with the full sample.  The associations between physical attractiveness and 
earnings were slightly stronger in the limited sample than in the full sample; this was because 
those with extremely low Rwgs (and were thus excluded from the limited sample) were 
simultaneously more likely to be very unattractive (as Table 1 shows) and to earn more (see 
Table 4 below).  The excluded respondents therefore weakened the positive association 
between physical attractiveness and earnings in the full sample. 
 
Test of the Discrimination Hypothesis 
Table 4 presents the mean gross earnings at 29 by physical attractiveness measured at 
four different ages.  It shows that very unattractive Add Health respondents at every age 
except 17 earned significantly more than unattractive respondents (16:  t(903) = 3.466; 22:  
t(797) = 5.172; 29:  t(978) = 5.167; p < .001 for all).  At 17, very unattractive respondents, 
while they did not earn statistically significantly more than unattractive respondents (t(518) = 
1.612, p = .108), nonetheless earned marginally significantly more than average-looking 
respondents (t(4914) = 1.726, p = .084).  Further, very unattractive respondents at 29 earned 
significantly more than average-looking and attractive respondents (average:  t(7044) = 
3.628, p < .001; attractive:  t(5654) = 2.415, p = .016)!  However, for Age 29, because 
physical attractiveness was measured at the same time as the earnings, the direction of 
causality is not clear.  Very unattractive respondents might have earned more for some 
reason, or respondents who earned more might have chosen to present themselves less 
attractively.  However, the same associations when physical attractiveness was measured 
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earlier in life suggested that the direction of causality might go from physical attractiveness 
(or lack thereof) to earnings. 
– Table 4 about here – 
At any rate, it is clear that the association between physical attractiveness and 
earnings was not at all monotonic, as predicted by the discrimination hypothesis.  In fact, 
while there is some evidence of the beauty premium in Table 4, where attractive and very 
attractive Add Health respondents earn slightly more than the average-looking respondents, 
there is no clear evidence for the ugliness penalty, as very unattractive respondents at every 
age earn more than either unattractive or average-looking respondents. 
Even though the distribution of earnings at 29 had a positive skew like most earnings 
distributions, outliers were not the reason for the pattern observed above.  Table 4 also 
presents the median earnings by physical attractiveness in boldface.  While the differences 
in median earnings by physical attractiveness were less extreme than those in mean earnings, 
very unattractive respondents nevertheless had higher median earnings than unattractive 
respondents in all cases, and in many cases higher median earnings than average-looking or 
even attractive respondents.  The comparison of mean and median earnings by physical 
attractiveness suggested that the observed pattern where very unattractive respondents earned 
more than unattractive or average-looking respondents was not an artifact of outliers or 
skewed earnings distribution.  In addition, visual inspection of the distribution of earnings in 
each physical attractiveness category for all four waves did not indicate the existence of 
outliers in any of the distributions, and the comparison of the variance, range, skewness, and 
kurtosis showed that these statistics for the “very unattractive” category were at most 
comparable to, and often smaller than, the statistics for other physical attractiveness 
categories. 
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The results presented in Table 4 disconfirmed the discrimination hypothesis for the 
beauty premium, which predicts a monotonically positive association between physical 
attractiveness and earnings.  In separate results (not shown), we also examined the 
association between physical attractiveness and earnings separately by sex and by race (in 
four categories of whites, blacks, Asians, and Native Americans).  In none of the 28 
distributions of earnings by physical attractiveness was the association monotonically 
positive.  In each comparison, very unattractive respondents significantly earned more than 
the unattractive respondents, sometimes more than average-looking or attractive respondents.  
These results provided strong evidence against the discrimination hypothesis. 
Now what accounts for this peculiar pattern, where very unattractive Americans 
earned more than their unattractive or even average-looking counterparts?  For the most 
part, the nonmonotonic association between physical attractiveness and earnings appeared to 
reflect the underlying productivity of workers measured by their intelligence and education.  
As Table 5 shows, very unattractive Add Health respondents at 16 (t(772) = 2.079, p = .038) 
and 29 (t(857) = 5.092, p < .001) were significantly more intelligent than their unattractive 
counterparts.  At 29, they were also significantly more intelligent than average-looking 
workers (t(6015) = 3.604, p < .001). 
– Table 5 about here – 
Similarly, very unattractive Add Health respondents attained significantly higher 
levels of education than their unattractive and average-looking counterparts at 16 
(unattractive:  t(1013) = 5.283, p < .001; average:  t(7125) = 2.463, p = .014), 22 
(unattractive:  t(882) = 7.629, p < .001; average:  t(6209) = 4.676, p < .001), and 29 
(unattractive:  t(1133) = 11.269, p <.001; average:  t(7820) = 8.236, p < .001).  In 
addition, very unattractive Add Health respondents at 29 attained significantly more 
education than their attractive counterparts (t(6133) = 3.541, p < .001).  The nonmonotonic 
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associations between physical attractiveness and earnings at 29 therefore appeared to reflect 
at least partly the underlying differences in productivity measured by intelligence and 
education. 
 
Test of the self-selection hypothesis 
Table 6 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses, with physical 
attractiveness (measured by four different dummies for “unattractive,” “above average,” 
“attractive,” and “very attractive,” with “very unattractive” as the reference category), 
controlling only for sex, age, and education.  The results show that there is already very 
little evidence for the beauty premium and ugliness penalty even before we controlled for a 
host of individual differences (to test the individual differences hypothesis in Table 8 below), 
when “very unattractive” is the reference category.  Very attractive respondents earned 
marginally significantly more than the very unattractive respondents when physical 
attractiveness was measured at 16 (b = .116, p = .072, standardized coefficient = .040) and 29 
(b = .096, p = .097, standardized coefficient = .027), but not when measured at 17 or 22.  
This is the only evidence for the beauty premium, and there is absolutely no evidence for the 
ugliness penalty.  No other categories of respondents at any other time earned significantly 
more than the very unattractive respondents.  More importantly, very unattractive 
respondents earned significantly more than unattractive respondents when physical 
attractiveness was measured at 16 (b = -.171, p = .018, standardized coefficient = -.034), 22 
(b = -.304, p < .001, standardized coefficient = -.062), and 29 (b = -.308, p < .001, 
standardized coefficient = -.060).  Further, very unattractive respondents earned 
significantly more than average-looking respondents when physical attractiveness was 
measured at 29 (b = -.118, p = .024, standardized coefficient = -.057).  In other words, there 
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was some marginal evidence for the beauty premium, but even stronger evidence for the 
ugliness premium, in Table 6. 
– Table 6 about here – 
Table 7 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses with the same models 
as those presented in Table 6, except for the inclusion of 22 dummies to control for the 
respondent’s current occupation.  The results presented in Table 7 were virtually identical to 
those presented in Table 6; a comparison of Tables 6 and 7 revealed that controlling for the 
respondent’s occupation made virtually no substantive difference to the effect of physical 
attractiveness on earnings.  The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 jointly refuted the self-
selection hypothesis; what little evidence there was in the Add Health data for the beauty 
premium was not the result of workers sorting themselves into different occupations due to 
their level of physical attractiveness.  There didn’t appear to be any evidence of 
occupational self-selection by physical attractiveness, at least measured by earnings at 29. 
– Table 7 about here – 
 
Test of the individual differences hypothesis 
Table 8 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses, with further controls 
for respondent’s health, intelligence, Big Five personality factors, measured height, race, 
childhood family income, mother’s education, and father’s education.  With these further 
controls for individual differences, there was now absolutely no evidence for either the 
beauty premium or the ugliness penalty.  No category of physical attractiveness measured at 
any time earned significantly more than very unattractive respondents.  Further, very 
unattractive respondents earned significantly more than unattractive respondents when 
physical attractiveness was measured at 29 (b = -.210, p = .041, standardized coefficient = -. 
044) and marginally significantly more when it was measured at 22 (b = -.198, p = .073, 
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standardized coefficient = -.040).  In other words, there continued to be no evidence for the 
beauty premium but some evidence for the ugliness premium. 
– Table 8 about here – 
  In sharp contrast, results presented in Table 8 showed that there was a consistently 
positive effect of health (ps < .001) and intelligence (ps < .05) on earnings at 29.  Further, of 
the Big Five personality factors, Openness and Neuroticism were consistently negatively (ps 
< .001), and Extraversion was consistently positively (ps < .001) associated with earnings at 
29.  Health, intelligence, and Big Five personality factors are typically not controlled for in 
the analyses of the beauty premium on earnings in the economics of beauty, yet they are all 
significantly correlated with physical attractiveness.  In the Add Health data, health and 
intelligence were significantly positively correlated with physical attractiveness at all ages.  
Similarly, consistent with the condition-dependent model of personality (Kanazawa, 2011b; 
Lewis, 2015), all Big Five personality factors were significantly correlated with physical 
attractiveness for all ages; physically more attractive Add Health respondents were 
consistently more Open, more Conscientious, more Extraverted, more Agreeable, and less 
Neurotic. 
Careful comparisons of Tables 2, 6, 7, and 8 strongly suggested that past findings of 
the beauty premium and ugliness penalty might potentially have been attributable to two 
factors.  First, in most studies, very unattractive and unattractive workers are collapsed into 
the “below average” category, because of the usually very small number of workers who are 
very unattractive.  This might have masked the positive effect of being very unattractive on 
earnings and had it be drowned by the negative effect of being unattractive because there are 
always more unattractive than very unattractive respondents.  Indeed, if we collapsed the 
very unattractive and unattractive categories and used it as a reference category in our 
regression analyses presented in Table 6, the coefficients for about average, attractive, and 
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very attractive for all ages were statistically significantly positive (except for average at 16 
for which the coefficient was only marginally significantly positive), suggesting that not 
distinguishing very unattractive and unattractive did mask the unique nature of high-earning 
very unattractive individuals and made it appear that there was evidence for the “beauty 
premium.”  Second, no wage equations in the economics of beauty to our knowledge control 
for health, intelligence (as opposed to education) and the Big Five personality factors.  
Physical attractiveness may appear to have an effect on earnings, because more attractive 
workers are simultaneously healthier, more intelligent, and have better (in particular, more 
Conscientious, more Extraverted, and less Neurotic) personality more conducive to earning 
more. 
Just like earlier surveys of physical attractiveness, very few Add Health respondents 
were in the very unattractive category (ranging from .9% at 17 to 2.7% at 29).  As a result, 
the standard error of earnings among the very unattractive workers tended to be very large, 
which prompted earlier researchers in this field to collapse very unattractive and unattractive 
categories into a below-average category.  However, the very small number of very 
unattractive respondents and their large standard errors actually strengthened, rather than 
weakened, our conclusion because standard errors figured into all the significant tests in the 
pairwise comparisons.  Very unattractive workers earned statistically significantly more 
than unattractive and average-looking workers despite the large standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
The analyses of the Add Health data did not provide any support for the 
discrimination and occupational self-selection hypotheses for the “beauty premium” and 
“ugliness penalty.”  The association between physical attractiveness and earnings was not 
monotonic, as predicted by the discrimination hypothesis, and controlling for respondents’ 
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occupation did not eliminate or attenuate the association between physical attractiveness and 
earnings.  In sharp contrast, the analyses provided strong support for the individual 
difference hypothesis; the association between physical attractiveness and earnings largely 
disappeared once individual differences in health, intelligence, and personality were 
statistically controlled. 
One potential concern is that physically attractive women may be more likely to 
marry, marry early, or stay married, and consequently less likely to remain in the labor force 
at 29.  This concern was alleviated by the observation that the lack of beauty premium and 
ugliness penalty was equally evident both among men and women (results not shown).  
Since men were very unlikely to leave the labor force upon marriage, selection bias did not 
appear to be a concern.  Indeed, among women in the Add Health data, physical 
attractiveness at 16 was significantly positively associated with the probability that they were 
currently married at 29 (r = 0.76, p < .001, n = 8,334) and very attractive women at 16 were 
significantly more likely to be currently married at 29 (t(8332) = -4.423, p < .001).  
However, physical attractiveness at 16 was not at all associated with the probability that they 
were currently employed at 29 (r = .005, p = .621, n = 8,334) and very attractive women at 16 
were no less likely to be currently employed at 29 (t(8332) = .614, p = .539). 
One potential limitation of the analyses above is that the earnings was measured at a 
relatively young age of 29 (in the latest available wave of Add Health), although earlier 
studies of the beauty premium suggested that its effect began to appear very early in 
professional careers (Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998; Frieze et al., 1991).  If the beauty 
premium and ugliness penalty are cumulative throughout working careers, then they may 
show up in earnings of older workers.  Only future waves of Add Health data can shed light 
on this possibility.  Physical attractiveness is a very neglected variable in social science 
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data, and no other longitudinal data sets on a representative sample measures it as precisely 
as Add Health does. 
While our analyses suggested that physical attractiveness was not at all associated 
with earnings (at least not in the predicted direction) once intelligence, health, and Big Five 
personality factors were controlled, one should be cautious about making causal inferences.  
For example, the results presented in Table 8 showed that Neuroticism was consistently 
negatively associated with earnings while physical attractiveness was not.  However, studies 
show that early life experiences explain about half the variance in Neuroticism, and negative 
early life experiences significantly increase later Neuroticism (Jeronimus, Ormel, Aleman, 
Penninx, & Riese; Jeronimus, Riese, Sanderman, & Ormel, 2014).  To the extent that 
physically less attractive individuals are more likely to have negative life experiences, 
physical attractiveness may still be an ultimate cause of earnings via Neuroticism. 
Our findings – if robust – have important implications for labor economics and 
organizational behavior.  Discrimination – whether intentional or accidental – on the basis 
of arbitrary criteria that are not statistically associated with worker productivity decreases the 
efficiency and productivity of organizations in the long run.  In contrast, discrimination on 
the basis of individual traits that are statistically associated with worker productivity, while it 
may be illegal, does not lower organizational efficiency and productivity and may even 
increase them.  The results from Add Health presented above tentatively suggested that the 
repeated findings in the economics of beauty that physically more attractive workers earn 
more than physically less attractive workers, if indeed true, may not be an example of the 
former and may exemplify the latter type of “discrimination.”  This suggests that the 
“beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty” may not ultimately decrease the efficiency and 
productivity of organizations, because they may reflect the fact that healthier, more 
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intelligent workers who are more Conscientious and Extraverted and less Neurotic on 
average earn more. 
At the same time, our analyses highlighted the unique nature of very unattractive 
individuals.  The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 suggested that very unattractive 
individuals earned more than others who were physically more attractive because they were 
more intelligent and attained greater education.  However, it is not clear why very 
unattractive individuals are more intelligent and attain greater education, especially since this 
result contradicted earlier findings that intelligence and physical attractiveness were 
positively correlated (Kanazawa 2011a; Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004).  More research is 
clearly necessary to explore the unique nature of very unattractive individuals.  It is also 
important for future studies to replicate the findings above, adjudicate between the 
discrimination, self-selection and individual differences theories of the beauty premium, and 
advance and test other potential explanations.  We encourage labor economists and 
organizational psychologists to take physical attractiveness seriously as an individual trait, by 
routinely measuring it in their studies.  We further encourage researchers in the field of 
economics of beauty to control for health, intelligence, and personality traits (along with 
other factors that are relevant to productivity) in their multiple regression models. 
 
Conclusion 
Data from Add Health cast doubt on the very existence of the beauty premium and 
ugliness penalty, and disconfirmed the discrimination and self-selection hypotheses for them.  
Far from a monotonic positive association between physical attractiveness and earnings 
predicted by the discrimination hypothesis, the data showed that the association was 
nonmonotonic.  Very unattractive Add Health respondents always earned more than their 
unattractive counterparts, and sometimes more than their average-looking or even attractive 
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counterparts.  There was therefore some evidence for the ugliness premium.  Further, Add 
Health data provided no support for the self-selection hypothesis; controlling for the 
respondent’s occupation did not change the effect of physical attractiveness (or lack thereof) 
on earnings. 
In sharp contrast, the Add Health data provided strong support for the individual 
differences hypothesis.  Once health, intelligence, and Big Five personality factors (along 
with other correlates of physical attractiveness) were controlled in a multiple regression 
model, what little evidence existed for the beauty premium disappeared entirely.  Healthier 
and more intelligent respondents, and those with less Open, more Extraverted, and less 
Neurotic personality traits earned significantly more than others.   
Careful examination of the bivariate analyses, and comparison of multiple regression 
equations with and without controls for correlates of physical attractiveness suggested that 
past studies in the economics of beauty might have found evidence for the beauty premium 
and ugliness penalty for two reasons.  First, these studies invariably collapsed the “very 
unattractive” and “unattractive” categories to form “below-average” category, thereby failing 
to document the ugliness premium enjoyed by the very unattractive workers.  Second, few 
studies in the field controlled for health, intelligence (as opposed to education), and 
personality factors.  Physically more attractive workers may earn more, not necessarily 
because they are more beautiful, but because they are healthier, more intelligent, and have 
better (more Conscientious, more Extraverted, and less Neurotic) personality conducive to 
higher earnings. 
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Table 1. 
Interrater Agreement (mean Rwg) on Physical Attractiveness Ratings 
 
Full Sample 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive .1963 
(.3451) 
n = 181 
.1838 
(.4001) 
n = 85 
.1276 
(.3730) 
n = 204 
.1027 
(.3549) 
n = 280 
Unattractive .7585 
(.1768) 
n = 443 
.7530 
(.1895) 
n = 418 
.7366 
(.2021) 
n = 493 
.7358 
(.2076) 
n = 455 
About average .8409 
(.1610) 
n = 4,413 
.8344 
(.1761) 
n = 4,482 
.8320 
(.1705) 
n = 4,576 
.8279 
(.1720) 
n = 4,760 
Attractive .8139 
(.2066) 
n = 3,456 
.8002 
(.2226) 
n = 3,704 
.8088 
(.2098) 
n = 3,635 
.8185 
(.1955) 
n = 3,601 
Very attractive .6443 
(.3187) 
n = 1,547 
.6349 
(.3225) 
n = 1,351 
.6674 
(.3062) 
n = 1,132 
.6782 
(.2847) 
n = 944 
 
Women 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive .1398 
(.3735) 
n = 110 
.0180 
(.3750) 
n = 47 
.0796 
(.3697) 
n = 146 
.0374 
(.3645) 
n = 179 
Unattractive .7600 
(.1749) 
n = 194 
.7413 
(.1946) 
n = 175 
.7149 
(.2140) 
n = 257 
.7231 
(.2120) 
n = 243 
About average .8280 
(.1717) 
n = 2,106 
.8180 
(.1878) 
n = 2,223 
.8201 
(.1746) 
n = 2,221 
.8076 
(.1877) 
n = 2,430 
Attractive .8043 
(.2258) 
n = 2,024 
.7894 
(.2453) 
n = 2,131 
.8029 
(.2262) 
n = 2,094 
.8149 
(.2089) 
n = 2,049 
Very attractive .6415 
(.3424) 
n = 1,060 
.6352 
(.3497) 
n = 918 
.6653 
(.3372) 
n = 776 
.6744 
(.3238) 
n = 593 
 
Men 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive .2839 
(.2760) 
n = 71 
.3890 
(.3322) 
n = 38 
.2484 
(.3566) 
n = 58 
.2184 
(.3062) 
n = 101 
Unattractive .7574 
(.1787) 
n = 249 
.7614 
(.1857) 
n = 243 
.7603 
(.1859) 
n = 236 
.7503 
(.2020) 
n = 212 
  29 
About average .8527 
(.1497) 
n = 2,307 
.8505 
(.1621) 
n = 2,259 
.8432 
(.1659) 
n = 2,355 
.8492 
(.1510) 
n = 2,330 
Attractive .8274 
(.1752) 
n = 1,432 
.8149 
(.1864) 
n = 1,573 
.8169 
(.1850) 
n = 1,541 
.8232 
(.1763) 
n = 1,552 
Very attractive .6506 
(.2601) 
n = 487 
.6341 
(.2556) 
n = 433 
.6720 
(.2244) 
n = 356 
.6847 
(.2023) 
n = 351 
 
Note: (Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
ln(earnings) 
Physical 
attractiveness 
 
Sex 
 
Age 
 
Education 
(1)  .131*** .152*** .84*** .245*** 
(2)   -.164*** -.029** .201*** 
(3)    .053*** -.118*** 
(4)     -.018* 
Mean 3.24 .00 .47 29.10 5.67 
SD 1.04 1.00 .50 1.75 2.20 
 
Note: † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 3. 
Multiple regression of ln(earnings) with a continuous measure of physical attractiveness 
 
Full sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physical attractiveness .135*** 
(.011) 
.131 
.137*** 
(.011) 
.133 
.120*** 
(.010) 
.116 
.203 
(.182) 
.196 
(Physical attractiveness)2  -.019* 
(.008) 
-.024 
-.006 
(.008) 
-.008 
-.007 
(.008) 
-.009 
Sex   .425*** 
(.021) 
.206 
.424*** 
(.021) 
.206 
Age   .043*** 
(.006) 
.068 
.043*** 
(.006) 
.069 
Education   .122*** 
(.005) 
.257 
.122*** 
(.005) 
.257 
Physical attractiveness x 
Sex 
   -.042† 
(.021) 
-.026 
Physical attractiveness x 
Age 
   -.001 
(.006) 
-.031 
Physical attractiveness x 
Education 
   -.006 
(.005) 
-.035 
Constant 3.221 
(.011) 
3.239 
(.013) 
1.085 
(.182) 
1.075 
(.182) 
     
R2 .017 .018 .117 .117 
Number of cases 9,185 9,185 9,185 9,185 
 
 
Rwg ≥ .70 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physical attractiveness .150*** 
(.012) 
.147 
.159*** 
(.012) 
.153 
.140*** 
(.012) 
.137 
.275 
(.206) 
.270 
(Physical attractiveness)2  -.030*** 
(.009) 
-.041 
-.014 
(.009) 
-.019 
-.016† 
(.009) 
-.022 
Sex   .459*** 
(.024) 
.226 
.456*** 
(.024) 
.224 
Age   .045*** 
(.007) 
.073 
.046*** 
(.007) 
.073 
Education   .120*** 
(.005) 
.120*** 
(.005) 
  32 
.258 .259 
Physical attractiveness x 
Sex 
   -.057* 
(.025) 
-.036 
Physical attractiveness x 
Age 
   -.003 
(.007) 
-.074 
Physical attractiveness x 
Education 
   -.006 
(.005) 
-.037 
Constant 3.213 
(.012) 
3.243 
(.015) 
1.006 
(.205) 
.999 
(.205) 
     
R2 .022 .023 .131 .132 
Number of cases 6,884 6,883 6,884 6,884 
 
Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients 
 (Numbers in parentheses are standard errors) 
 Numbers in italics are standardized regression coefficients 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 4. 
Mean and median earnings at Age 29 by physical attractiveness, full sample 
 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive $38,371 
($49,151) 
$31,000 
n =261 
$42,504 
($101,771) 
$30,000 
n = 96 
$37,636 
($34,282) 
$32,000 
n = 230 
$44,831 
($73,406) 
$35,000 
n = 373 
Unattractive $30,027*** 
($23,131) 
$27,000 
n = 644 
$31,278 
($48,191) 
$25,000 
n = 424 
$26,902*** 
($22,718) 
$24,000 
n = 569 
$27,707*** 
($28,067) 
$24,000 
n = 607 
About average $36,092 
($48,953) 
$30,000 
n = 6,212 
$34,697† 
($41,940) 
$30,000 
n =4,820 
$35,309 
($41,636) 
$30,000 
n = 5,458 
$35,547*** 
($46,284) 
$30,000 
n = 6,673 
Attractive $37,748 
($38,012) 
$32,000 
n =4,920 
$37,591 
($40,757) 
$32,000 
n = 3,990 
$39,739 
($49,337) 
$33,000 
n = 4,325 
$38,980* 
($42,546) 
$34,000 
n = 5,283 
Very attractive $42,230 
($52,336) 
$35,000 
n = 2,188 
$38,596 
($32,643) 
$35,000 
n =1,437 
$43,042 
($57,694) 
$35,000 
n = 1,341 
$42,854 
($44,548) 
$36,000 
n = 1,314 
Total $37,376 
($45,193) 
n = 14,225 
$36,225 
($41,610) 
n =10,767 
$37,430 
($45,939) 
n = 11,923 
$37,403 
($45,187) 
n = 14,250 
 
Note: (Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed), in comparison 
to Very unattractive 
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Table 5. 
Mean IQ and education by physical attractiveness 
 
IQ 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive 99.961 
(15.945) 
n = 216 
98.514 
(16.434) 
n = 84 
97.824 
(18.723) 
n = 224 
102.018 
(15.394) 
n = 333 
Unattractive 97.364* 
(15.451) 
n = 558 
97.180 
(15.763) 
n = 389 
96.317 
(15.361) 
n = 592 
96.218*** 
(16.794) 
n = 526 
About average 98.694 
(15.531) 
n = 5,144 
98.893 
(15.432) 
n = 4,137 
98.614 
(15.391) 
n = 5,436 
98.922*** 
(15.226) 
n = 5,684 
Attractive 100.971 
(14.533) 
n = 4,150 
100.944 
(14.525) 
n = 3,461 
101.632 
(14.201) 
n = 4,359 
101.137 
(14.436) 
n = 4,313 
Very attractive 102.348 
(13.731) 
n = 1,869 
102.131 
(14.438) 
n = 1,258 
102.324 
(14.146) 
n = 1,347 
102.338 
(14.085) 
n = 1,107 
Total 100.018 
(14.994) 
n = 11,937 
100.016 
(15.050) 
n = 9,329 
100.004 
(15.004) 
n = 11,958 
100.004 
(14.994) 
n = 11.963 
 
 
Education 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Very unattractive 5.727 
(2.374) 
n = 293 
5.400 
(2.138) 
n = 105 
6.121 
(2.062) 
n = 248 
6.298 
(2.164) 
n = 426 
Unattractive 4.928*** 
(2.101) 
n = 722 
5.043 
(2.306) 
n = 488 
4.909*** 
(2.145) 
n = 636 
4.788*** 
(2.198) 
n = 709 
About average 5.405* 
(2.181) 
n = 6,834 
5.400 
(2.212) 
n = 5,290 
5.462*** 
(2.180) 
n = 5,963 
5.404*** 
(2.181) 
n = 7,396 
Attractive 5.881 
(2.168) 
n =5,390 
5.890 
(2.172) 
n = 4,371 
5.978 
(2.195) 
n = 4,708 
5.915*** 
(2.155) 
n = 5,709 
Very attractive 6.147 
(2.152) 
n = 2,406 
6.204 
(2.051) 
n = 1,576 
6.284 
(2.068) 
n = 1,459 
6.290 
(2.103) 
n = 1,429 
Total 5.667 
(2.197) 
n = 15,645 
5.673 
(2.203) 
n = 11,830 
5.726 
(2.197) 
n = 13,014 
5.667 
(2.196) 
n = 15,669 
Note: (Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed), in comparison 
to Very unattractive 
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Table 6. 
Multiple regression of ln(earnings) at Age 29, full sample 
 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Physical attractiveness     
Unattractive -.171* 
(.073) 
-.034 
-.160 
(.111) 
-.030 
-.304*** 
(.077) 
-.062 
-.308*** 
(.065) 
-.060 
About average -.063 
(.062) 
-.030 
-.003 
(.101) 
-.001 
-.086 
(.066) 
-.041 
-.118* 
(.053) 
-.057 
Attractive .033 
(.063) 
.015 
.078 
(.102) 
.036 
.041 
(.066) 
.019 
.012 
(.053) 
.006 
Very attractive .116† 
(.065) 
.040 
.146 
(.104) 
.048 
.092 
(.070) 
.028 
.096† 
(.058) 
.027 
Sex .406*** 
(.017) 
.194 
.404*** 
(.019) 
.194 
.408*** 
(.018) 
.196 
.395*** 
(.017) 
.189 
Age .046*** 
(.005) 
.078 
.045*** 
(.006) 
.070 
.046*** 
(.005) 
.078 
.048*** 
(.005) 
.081 
Education .127*** 
(.004) 
.263 
.129*** 
(.004) 
.270 
.125*** 
(.004) 
.262 
.125*** 
(.004) 
.259 
Constant .971 
(.153) 
.959 
(.200) 
1.014 
(.166) 
.982 
(.148) 
     
R2 .106 .107 .112 .109 
Number of cases 14,224 10,767 11,922 14,249 
 
Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients 
 (Numbers in parentheses are standard errors) 
 Numbers in italics are standardized regression coefficients 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 7. 
Multiple regression of ln(earnings) at Age 29, full sample, with industry controls 
 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Physical attractiveness     
Unattractive -.118† 
(.070) 
-.024 
-.092 
(.107) 
-.017 
-.271*** 
(.074) 
-.056 
-.289*** 
(.063) 
-.056 
About average -.051 
(.060) 
-.025 
.027 
(.098) 
.013 
-.077 
(.064) 
-.037 
-.104* 
(.051) 
-.050 
Attractive .031 
(.060) 
.014 
.089 
(.098) 
.042 
.026 
(.064) 
.012 
-.003 
(.051) 
-.001 
Very attractive .113† 
(.062) 
.039 
.150 
(.100) 
.050 
.056 
(.068) 
.017 
.076 
(.056) 
.021 
Sex .310*** 
(.019) 
.150 
.319*** 
(.022) 
.155 
.307*** 
(.021) 
.149 
.303*** 
(.019) 
.147 
Age .042*** 
(.005) 
.071 
.041*** 
(.006) 
.064 
.041*** 
(.005) 
.069 
.044*** 
(.005) 
.074 
Education .102*** 
(.004) 
.214 
.104*** 
(.005) 
.220 
.102*** 
(.005) 
.216 
.100*** 
(.004) 
.211 
Constant 1.608 
(.152) 
1.530 
(.198) 
1.660 
(.166) 
1.626 
(.147) 
     
R2 .163 .164 .166 .165 
Number of cases 13,982 10,589 11,718 14,006 
 
Note: In addition to sex, age, and education, the industry of the respondent’s current 
occupation is controlled with 22 dummies (not shown). 
 Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients 
 (Numbers in parentheses are standard errors) 
 Numbers in italics are standardized regression coefficients 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 8. 
Multiple regression of ln(earnings) at Age 29, full sample, with industry controls 
 
 Physical attractiveness measured at 
 Age 16 Age 17 Age 22 Age 29 
Physical attractiveness     
Unattractive -.123 
(.119) 
-.025 
-.025 
(.157) 
-.005 
-.198† 
(.111) 
-.040 
-.210* 
(.103) 
-.044 
About average -.160 
(.103) 
-.079 
.026 
(.144) 
.013 
.024 
(.092) 
.012 
-.059 
(.085) 
-.030 
Attractive -.058 
(.104) 
-.028 
.090 
(.145) 
.044 
.115 
(.093) 
.056 
.032 
(.085) 
.015 
Very attractive .015 
(.106) 
.005 
.170 
(.147) 
.059 
.130 
(.097) 
.042 
.094 
(.092) 
.028 
Health .054*** 
(.014) 
.053 
.053*** 
(.014) 
.052 
.051*** 
(.014) 
.050 
.050*** 
(.014) 
.049 
IQ .003* 
(.001) 
.039 
.003* 
(.001) 
.039 
.003* 
(.001) 
.038 
.003* 
(.001) 
.040 
Big Five 
personality factors 
    
Openness -.021*** 
(.006) 
-.053 
-.021*** 
(.006) 
-.052 
-.021*** 
(.006) 
-.052 
-.022*** 
(.006) 
-.054 
Conscientiousness .008† 
(.005) 
.022 
.009† 
(.005) 
.023 
.008 
(.005) 
.021 
.008 
(.005) 
.022 
Extraversion .021*** 
(.004) 
.064 
.021*** 
(.004) 
.065 
.021*** 
(.004) 
.064 
.021*** 
(.004) 
.064 
Agreeableness -.008 
(.006) 
-.019 
-.008 
(.006) 
-.019 
-.007 
(.006) 
-.018 
-.007 
(.006) 
-.018 
Neuroticism -.017*** 
(.005) 
-.047 
-.017*** 
(.005) 
-.046 
-.017*** 
(.005) 
-.047 
-.017** 
(.005) 
-.045 
Measured height -.002 
(.002) 
-.018 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.018 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.021 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.021 
Sex .293*** 
(.040) 
.146 
.290*** 
(.040) 
.145 
.293*** 
(.040) 
.146 
.290*** 
(.040) 
.145 
Age .038*** 
(.008) 
.061 
.038*** 
(.008) 
.061 
.039*** 
(.008) 
.063 
.039*** 
(.008) 
.063 
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Race     
Black -.094* 
(.038) 
-.033 
-.102** 
(.039) 
-.036 
-.101** 
(.038) 
-.036 
-.105** 
(.038) 
-.037 
Asian .070 
(.054) 
.017 
.070 
(.054) 
.017 
.063 
(.054) 
.015 
.070 
(.054) 
.017 
Native American -.151* 
(.061) 
-.032 
-.144* 
(.061) 
-.030 
-.141* 
(.061) 
-.030 
-.140* 
(.061) 
-.030 
Education .077*** 
(.008) 
.166 
.077*** 
(.008) 
.166 
.076*** 
(.008) 
.164 
.076*** 
(.008) 
.163 
Childhood family income .001* 
(.000) 
.034 
.001* 
(.000) 
.035 
.001* 
(.000) 
.035 
.001* 
(.000) 
.036 
Mother’s education -.008 
(.009) 
-.015 
-.009 
(.009) 
-.017 
-.008 
(.009) 
-.014 
-.009 
(.009) 
-.016 
Father’s education .006 
(.008) 
.013 
.007 
(.008) 
.013 
.006 
(.008) 
.012 
.007 
(.008) 
.014 
Constant 2.180 
(.435) 
2.000 
(.446) 
2.042 
(.433) 
2.140 
(.427) 
     
R2 .196 .195 .197 .196 
Number of cases 4,943 4,945 4,946 4,948 
 
Note: In addition to sex, age, and education, the industry of the respondent’s current 
occupation is controlled with 22 dummies (not shown). 
 Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients 
 (Numbers in parentheses are standard errors) 
 Numbers in italics are standardized regression coefficients 
 † p < .10 * p < .05 **  p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
